This paper studies the consequences of accidental and intended bequests in stochastic life-cycle models with uninsured idiosyncratic risk. Four main findings emerge. (i ) Accidental bequests are nearly as large as total bequests in U.S. data. As a result, life-cycle models leave little room for intended bequests. (ii ) Accidental or altruistic bequests can account for key features of bequest and wealth observations. (iii ) The steady state and comparative statics properties of the model are little affected by assumptions about the type or strength of parental bequest motives, unless bequests are much larger than in the data. However, abstracting from bequests as is commonly done in life-cycle models modifies the outcomes of tax experiments in important ways. (iv ) Neither accidental nor intended bequests have sizable effects on the wealth distribution. As a result, even confiscatory estate taxation may not be an effective instrument for promoting wealth equality.
Introduction
An important objective of macroeconomic research is the quantitative evaluation of government policies. The approach, pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , consists of solving a computable general equilibrium model under alternative policy scenarios. One model feature that affects the outcomes of some policy experiments in important way is the modeling of intergenerational transfers. Existing studies have modeled such transfers in many different ways. For reasons of tractability, intergenerational transfers are often abstracted from (e.g., Davies and Whalley 1991). Alternatively, studies commonly assume that all cohorts are linked through operative altruistic bequest motives, in which case households may be represented by an infinitely lived dynasty (e.g., Castaneda et al. 2000 ). Yet other studies assume that bequests arise accidentally as persons die while holding nonannuitized wealth (e.g., Gokhale et al. 2001) or that bequests are motivated by a joy-of-giving motive where parents value the intergenerational transfer itself, independently of its impact on the recipients (e.g., Abel 1987) .
The question addressed in this paper is to what extent alternative models of bequest behavior are consistent with household data on inheritances and retirement wealth. In addition, the paper investigates how assumptions about bequest behavior, parameterized to match aggregate inheritance flows in the U.S., affect the outcomes of policy experiments. To illustrate why bequest motives may have important implications for policy effects, consider the example of a capital income tax. If cohorts are linked by operative altruistic bequest motives, then the long-run interest elasticity of saving is infinite and a capital income tax has a "large" impact on the steady state capital stock. However, if agents are selfish, the interest elasticity of saving is determined by preference parameters and may be quite small, so that taxing capital income may have only a "small" effect on the steady state capital stock. 1 To study the implications of alternative bequest motives, the paper develops versions of a standard life-cycle model that encompass accidental, altruistic, and joy-of-giving bequests. The model features a stochastic process for labor endowments that allows it to match the wealth concentration in U.S. data. Steady state equilibria are characterized numerically and compared with U.S. data on inheritances and household wealth holdings. In addition, the outcomes of a number of simple tax policy experiments are computed for each bequest motive. These include changes in estate taxes and in capital and labor income taxes.
Findings The paper first considers a baseline model with only accidental bequests. A robust property of this model is that accidental bequests are nearly as large as aggregate bequest flows in U.S. data. This findings suggests that intended bequests play only a small role in accounting for observed bequest flows. The baseline model also comes close to replicating the size distribution of inheritances. It matches the observation that 70% of households receive no or negligible inheritances, while the top 2% of households account for the majority of all inheritances. However, the model has a number of shortcomings that are related to intergenerational persistence. Wealth and consumption are only about half as persistent as in the data. In addition, the incomes and wealth holdings of households who receive large inheritances are not sufficiently different from those who receive small or no inheritances.
The paper examines next how the model's steady state properties are affected by the presence of altruistic or joy-of-giving bequest motives. I find that intended bequests, parameterized to match the size of aggregate bequests in U.S. data, have only very small effects on the model's steady state properties, including the size distributions of inheritances and wealth. The only important exception is that in the joy-of-giving model too many low-wealth households leave positive bequests. One reason is that bequests must be given little weight in the households' utility functions; otherwise the models generate inheritance flows that are far larger than in the data. I conclude that accidental bequests account for the majority, and possibly for all, of observed bequests flows. The fact that assumptions about bequest motives have little impact on the model's steady state makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the motives underlying intended bequests (if they exist). Neither altruistic nor joy-of-giving bequests help reconcile the model with intergenerational persistence observations. Together with the finding that the model comes close to replicating the size distribution of inheritances, this suggests that the model's shortcomings are not related to assumptions about bequest motives. One possible reason for the lack of intergenerational persistence in the model is that, in addition to labor earnings, other variables affecting either income or saving rates may be transmitted from parents to children.
These finding suggest a reason why previous attempts at empirically discriminating between alternative bequest motives have proven inconclusive. A large literature employs econometric tests of overidentifying restrictions implied by particular bequest theories (e.g., Altonji et al. 1997 ). The main conclusion is a negative one: "Each motive that has been tested has also been rejected" (Gale and Perozek, 2000, p. 7) . My findings suggest that the statistical rejections of theories of intended bequests may be due to the fact that most bequests are accidental. Large accidental bequests imply that alternative models of bequest behavior have very similar quantitative implications, leaving little identifying variation to distinguish between bequest motives.
Given the uncertainty about the nature of intended bequests it is important to investigate whether the outcomes of policy experiments are sensitive to assumptions about bequest motives. The paper revisits a range of public policy questions that have been previously investigated in models embodying special assumptions about bequest motives which are relaxed here. These include changes in estate taxes and in capital and labor income taxes. For income tax changes, I find that the outcomes of policy experiments are nearly invariant to assumptions about bequest motives as well as to reasonable variations in the size of bequest flows. These findings suggest that abstracting from intended bequests, a common simplifying assumption, does not modify the outcomes of income tax experiments in important ways. This contrasts with the findings of Engen et al. (1997) and Hendricks (2000) who show that altruistic bequests substantially alter the steady state effects of tax policies in models with certain lifetimes. The discrepancy is due to the fact that in their models all households have operative bequest motives and all bequests are intended. In the model studied here, only bequests that are much larger than those found in the data significantly modify the effects of income tax changes. However, this does not imply that bequests can be abstracted from entirely. Assuming that accidental bequests are redistributed as lump-sum transfers to all households, as is commonly done in life-cycle models, substantially alters the outcomes of income tax experiments. The bequest motive also strongly affects the implications of estate taxation for capital formation and output.
The final question addressed in the paper is whether bequests contribute to wealth inequality. Based on a stochastic life-cycle model, Gokhale et al. (2001) find that accidental bequests slightly reduce wealth inequality, at least in the presence of a social security system. De Nardi (2000) reports a similar result, but also finds that joy-of-giving bequests help life-cycle models account for wealth inequality and for the emergence of large estates. My findings confirm the unimportance of accidental bequests for wealth inequality. However, in contrast to De Nardi (2000) , I find that neither altruistic nor joy-of-giving bequests have an important effect on the wealth distribution, unless bequest flows are much larger than in the data. This suggests that even confiscatory estate taxation may not be an effective instrument for promoting wealth equality.
Existing Research Existing research on intergenerational transfers is vast, but little work has been done quantifying the importance of alternative bequest motives. This paper complements attempts at econometrically testing theories of bequest behavior (e.g., Laitner and Ohlsson 2000) . The paper closest to the present one is Gokhale et al. (2001) who also find that accidental bequests account for the magnitude of aggregate bequest flows. This paper extends Gokhale et al.'s work in a number of respects. First, households in the present model optimally chose consumption and savings, given standard values of risk-aversion. By contrast, Ghokale et al.'s model features infinitely risk-averse agents who consume only their safe incomes. Second, in addition to aggregate bequest flows, this paper studies to what extent standard theory can account for the micro-structure of bequests and old-age saving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents evidence about bequests and old-age saving in the United States. The model is described in section 3. Results from the numerical experiments are presented in section 4. The final section concludes.
Empirical Evidence on Inheritances and Old-age Saving
This section summarizes key features of U.S. data on inheritances and old-age saving. The empirical procedures are documented in detail in Hendricks (2001) . The data reported below draw on three sources. The first source is a sample of households drawn from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a nationally representative cross-section of households with good coverage of households in the upper tails of the income and wealth distributions. Inheritances are reported retrospectively. The second data source is a sample of household drawn from the 1968-92 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This data set has the benefit of following individuals over time. It is also possible to match parents to their adult children. Inheritance data are collected retrospectively in 1984 and annually from 1988 onwards. An important limitation of the PSID is the relative small number of rich households sampled. In addition, dollar figures are top-coded. The third source of evidence consists of summary statistics collected from other studies.
Evidence on Inheritances
Size distribution Tables 1 and 2 report the size distribution of lifetime inheritances in my SCF and PSID samples. Inheritances are scaled by mean household earnings. For each household head, the lifetime inheritance is calculated as the discounted present value at age 50 of all inheritances reported during the person's lifetime. The samples are restricted to households with at most one surviving parent (of head and spouse, if a spouse is present). Similar results are obtained if only households with no surviving parents are included, but the sample sizes are then smaller. In all of the tables displayed in this section, the top panel shows U.S. data, while the bottom panel displays the corresponding "data" generated by versions of the model described below.
The distribution of inheritances is highly skewed. In the SCF sample, the top 2% of households inherit 44 times mean household earnings and account for almost 70% of all inheritances. By contrast, the bottom two-thirds receive less than 10% of mean household earnings. The concentration of inheritances is only slightly weaker in the PSID sample. On average, households in the SCF receive 1.3 times mean earnings over their lifetimes. These figures suggest that inheritances are not an important source of lifetime resources for the vast majority of households. This conclusion is supported by Joulfaian's (1994) study of estate tax records. He finds that even for the top 2.5% of estates the ratio of child inheritance to AGI is only 3.2, suggesting that inheritances account for only around 10% lifetime incomes.
Note that the PSID reports inheritances less than half as large as the SCF. A likely reason is recall bias. In the 1984 retrospective interview, only 0.5% of households report receiving an inheritance in each prior year. By contrast, 2% of households report an inheritance in each of the annual interviews since 1988. For the annual interviews, the mean inheritance amounts to 1.3% of household earnings, which is consistent with the SCF estimate. This problem severely limits the usefulness of the PSID data. Additional problems exist with PSID wealth data, which appear to be very noisy and fail to sample the richest households. I therefore use mainly SCF data on inheritances and wealth for model evaluation.
An observation that is at times interpreted to cast doubt on the altruistic bequest model is the positive correlation between household income and inheritance. Table 3 shows that households in the top SCF income quintile inherit 20 times more than households in the bottom quintile (in the PSID, the ratio is 9.5). However, there is no clear relationship between lifetime inheritances and the present value of lifetime earnings in my PSID sample, except that the top quintile inherits more than double the amounts received by the lower quintiles.
[ 
Evidence on Saving and Wealth
In addition to inheritance data, the models may be usefully compared with savings and wealth observations. Wealth holdings are highly concentrated among a small fraction of households. Table 4 shows the size distribution of net worth (including real estate, but excluding pension wealth) in the SCF and the PSID. The top 1% of households own 37% of total wealth in the SCF, while the bottom 20% own negative or no wealth. Wealth holdings at the outset of retirement are at least as unequally distributed as wealth holdings across all ages (table 6) . This observation will likely challenge a broad class of theories in which households have considerable ability to self-insure against income shocks during work life. An indirect way of assessing the importance of inheritances for wealth accumulation and inequality is to compare wealth holdings of households who did and who did not inherit. Table 7 shows the distribution of net worth at retirement (ages 63-67) in the SCF. Households who inherited at least 5% of mean household earnings hold 2.5 times more wealth than those who did not inherit. The concentration of wealth among inheriting households is considerably smaller than among non-inheriting households. Of course, this does not mean that inheritances are the source of these wealth differences.
[INSERT TABLES 4 THROUGH 7 HERE]
The Model
The economic environment is a version of the stochastic incomplete markets life-cycle model commonly used to study the wealth distribution (e.g., Huggett 1996; Castaneda et al. 2000) . The economy is inhabited by a continuum of ex ante identical households, by a single representative firm, and by a government. All markets are competitive and the economy is in steady state.
Households
Each household consists of overlapping generations of parents and children. Each parent has n c = 1 children who are born T G periods before their parents die. At the beginning of time, a unit mass of agents is alive. Households age stochastically as in Castaneda et al. (2000) . Each household lives through a = 1, ..., A "ages", each of which lasts a random number of periods. A household solves the following problem:
subject to the budget constraint
and the borrowing constraint k t+1 ≥ 0. Here, t indexes the date, T is the household's stochastic lifetime, r is the (constant) rate of return to capital, w is the after-tax wage rate, τ a is a lump-sum transfer, and h a e t q is the household's labor endowment. The latter is the product of a permanent endowment (q), a transitory endowment (e t ), and a deterministic age-efficiency profile h a which depends on the age state a described more fully below. k denotes the household's capital stock. The evolution of the random variables e and a is governed by exogenous Markov processes described in more detail below. The household values own consumption (c) and, in case of death, the bequest left to his children according to the value function b V . The arguments ψ 0 and q 0 in the value functionV belong to the children. The parameter ψ determines the intensity of the parent's bequest motive.
Household Problem: Dynamic Programming Representation
The household problem may be represented as a stationary dynamic program:
At the beginning of the period, the household is endowed with a state vector s = (a, k, e, ψ, q). The timing of events within each period is as follows. First, the household chooses current consumption c(s) and savings k 0 = κ(s) subject to the budget constraint. At the end of the period, the household's next period age state is drawn. With probability 1 − φ a the household remains in age state a in the next period. Then a new transitory labor endowment e 0 is chosen from the set {ω 1 , ..., ω n w } according to the Markov transition matrix Pr(e 0 = ω j | e = ω i ; a) = Ω a (ω i , ω j ) and the next period state vector is s 0 = (a, k 0 , e 0 , ψ, q). With probability φ a (1 − µ a ) the household advances to the next age state, but does not die. The household problem then continues with a new labor endowment drawn according to Ω a+1 and a state vector of s 0 = (a + 1, k 0 , e 0 , ψ, q). During retirement (a > a R ), the transitory labor endowment is equal to zero.
With probability φ a µ a the household dies at the end of the period. For the last phase death is certain: µ A = 1. In the case of death, the household's place is taken by a new agent (the household's child), who starts life with a = 1, with a transitory endowment drawn according to Ω 0 , and with a permanent labor endowment drawn from the set {q 1 , ..., q nq } according to the Markov transition matrix Pr(q 0 = q j | q = q i ) = Λ(q i , q j ), and an altruism parameter ψ 0 which is drawn independently for each household from the density Ψ. Below, I will consider the case where some fraction of households is altruistic and shares the same ψ > 0, while the remaining households are not altruistic and have ψ = 0. The purpose of this distinction is to compare the savings behavior of parents with that of childless households.
The inheritance per child is determined as follows. In each period, a parent chooses the amount of capital to take into the next period, k 0 = κ(s). If the parent survives, κ(s) will be his capital endowment tomorrow. However, if the parent dies, each child receives an amountb(κ) at age T G , where the function b(κ) is given to the parent. For example, if inheritances are taxed at rate τ b and each parent has n c children, then each child inheritsb(κ) = (1 − τ b ) κ / n c . It is important to capture the fact that parents and children overlap, so that inheritances are received when the children are middle aged. However, keeping the model computationally tractable when parents are altruistic requires to model parents and children as if they did not overlap. Otherwise the state space for the parent's problem would include the child's state variables and vice versa. These two requirements are reconciled by imposing two informational assumptions. First, the parent does not know anything about the child's life history, even though the child has lived for a number of periods before the parent dies. The second assumption is that the child learns at the beginning of life how much it will inherit from the parent. In other words, the child must know the realization of the parent's random lifetime events (such as earnings). Furthermore, the child can borrow the present value of its future inheritance. This allows me to solve the household problem as if the child were born after the parent's death. Instead of inheriting a random amount b b(κ) at age T G , the child may be thought of as receiving a capital endowment of b(κ) = b b(κ) (1 + r) −T G at birth. Similarly, the parent values an inheritance as augmenting the child's age 1 capital endowment by b(κ). This setup also affects the interpretation of the household's borrowing constraint. The household can borrow up to the present value of his future inheritance without violating the constraint k t+1 ≥ 0.
The value function for bequests depends on the nature of parental altruism. I consider three versions of altruism. If the household is selfish, then no utility is derived from leaving a bequest: b V = 0. If the household has joy-of-giving altruism (Abel 1987 ), then utility is derived from the size of the inheritance:
The value function in (2) implies that the parent cares not about the amount given, but about the amount received by the children. The functional form together with the restriction σ = σ * ensures that the ratio of bequests to consumption does not diverge in a growing economy. Finally, in the case of Becker-Barro altruism, the value of the inheritance to the parent equals the child's value function at age 1:
The first-order conditions for this problems are given by
The Euler equation for this problem is
With joy-of-giving altruismV
While complicated in appearance, the interpretation of the Euler equation is entirely conventional. Giving up one unit of consumption incurs the marginal utility cost u 0 (c(s)), which is the left-handside of the Euler equation. If the household survives, consuming next period yields marginal utility β u 0 (c(s 0 )) (1 + r 0 ); this occurs with probability (1 − φ a µ a ) and is represented by the first two lines on the right-hand-side of (3). The only non-standard feature is that next period's age state can either be a or a + 1.
Firms
A single representative firm solves a standard static profit maximization problem. It rents capital K and labor L from households so as to maximize
where F is a constant returns to scale production function. Profit maximization requires that factor prices equal marginal products:
Government
The government taxes labor income at a proportional rate and provides lump-sum transfers to retired households. The wage tax rate is τ w , so that the after-tax wage rate is given by w = (1−τ w ) w G . Capital income is taxed at the proportional rate τ K . The after-tax interest rate therefore equals r = (r G − δ) (1 − τ K ). Aggregate wage tax revenues then equal τ w w G L. Bequests are taxed at the proportional rate τ b . Transfers are paid in equal amounts to all retired households. Hence, τ s = 0 if a(s) ≤ a R and τ s = τ R otherwise, where τ R is a constant. Aggregate transfer payments amount to R Θ(s) τ s ds, where Θ(s) denotes the density of households over states. Any excess tax revenues are used for government consumption (G). The government budget constraint is therefore
where B are aggregate bequest flows. The proportional estate tax is, of course, highly counterfactual. Its purpose is to capture the fact that a fraction of the estate is lost to death expenses and taxes. The total fraction lost to such expenses appears to be similar for rich and for poor households (see the companion paper for details). The assumption that the marginal tax is constant is more problematical, but simplifies the analysis.
Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of aggregates (K, C, G), a price system (r G , w G ), a value function (V ), policy functions (c, κ), and a distribution over household types, Θ(s), such that:
• The policy functions and value function solve the household problem.
• Firms maximize profits.
• Markets clear.
• The government budget is balanced.
• The distribution of household types is stationary.
• Inheritances, expressed as additions to capital endowments at birth, relate to bequests (k p ) as
, where l(s) = 1 for states with a ≤ a R and l(s) = 0 otherwise. The goods market clears if
Discussion
A number of model extensions would be of interest, but are left for future research. For the majority of households, it is likely that investments in child human capital and, to a lesser extent, inter-vivos transfers constitute the largest part of intergenerational transfers. Abstracting from these types of transfers is, however, not likely to affect the conclusions drawn about wealth-rich households, who account for the bulk of bequests. Evidence from estate tax records suggests that inter-vivos transfers are far smaller than bequests for rich parents (Joulfaian 1994) . Another useful extension is the study of strategic interactions between parents and children.
Model Parameters
This section describes the choice of model parameters, which are summarized in table 8.
[
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Demographics New households enter the model at physical age 20 (model age 1). In the data, inheritances are typically received around age 50. I therefore set the generation gap to T G = 30 years. Households live through A = 11 phases. The first two phases represent the household's working life (a R = 2). The transition probabilities φ a are chosen such that these phases last on average 23 years each, corresponding to physical ages 20 to 65. The remaining 9 phases represent retirement and last on average 3 years each. Mortality rates are taken from the Period Life Table, 1997, of the Social Security Administration. The first model deaths occur at the end of phase 2, i.e. at the transition to retirement. The mortality rate µ 2 is chosen to minimize the deviations from the fraction of households surviving from age 20 to age 65. In the last phase, the mortality rate equals µ A = 1 by definition. In the intervening retirement years, the mortality rate is independent of age (µ a R +1 = ... = µ A−1 ) and chosen to match the observed fraction of households that survive from age 65 to ages 70, 75, ..., 90. Figure 1 shows the fractions of households surviving by age implied by the model and the data.
These choices reflect a tradeoff between computational simplicity and realistic mortality rates. Given this paper's focus on saving and bequests at advanced ages, matching life-expectancy during retirement appears crucial. Hence, retirement is divided into many short phases. Matching the duration of work life, on the other hand, appears less important and computationally more costly because the household's state space is larger during work periods.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Preferences The period utility function is of the CRRA type: u(c) = c 1−σ /(1 − σ). The curvature parameter σ is set to a conventional value of 2. The discount factor β is chosen to match a capital-output ratio of 2.5. The altruism parameter ψ takes on the values of zero orψ. The fraction of non-altruistic agents, Ψ(0), matches the fraction of childless households in the 1990 census of 0.19. The strength of the bequest motive,ψ, is chosen to generate an average ratio of inheritances to mean household earnings of 1.28. In the joy-of-giving model, I set the curvature of the bequest utility function equal to that of the period utility function (σ * = σ). This ensures that the model is consistent with balanced growth. 4 Labor Endowments Parameterizing the stochastic process for labor endowments is made difficult by the scarcity of panel data on household earnings. Some datasets, such as the PSID, provide longitudinal information, but the earnings data are top-coded. The SCF avoids top-coding, but contains only crosssection information. A number of previous studies imposed earnings processes estimated from top-coded data and found that the models could not generate the large wealth holdings found among the richest households in the data. An alternative, proposed by Castaneda et al. (2000) is to choose parameters of the labor endowment process to match points on the cross-sectional income and wealth distributions together with information on earnings mobility. The resulting endowment process has two components.
If n w denotes the number of endowment states, then the lower n w − 1 states resemble an endowment process that is estimated from top-coded panel data. In addition, there is a very large and highly transitory earnings state, which helps the model replicate the large fractions of income and wealth of the richest 1% of households. As in Castaneda et al. (2000) , an additional high endowment state is added to the transitory endowment process in order to generate sufficient wealth concentration. This state is reached from any endowment state with an arbitrary probability of 0.2%. Its level is chosen such that in equilibrium the top 1% of households own 29.5% of aggregate wealth. The labor income distribution implied by the model is quite close to SCF data (table 9). The Gini coefficient for both model and data is 0.63. The model process captures both the fraction of total labor income received by each percentile class as well as the maximum income level in each class fairly closely. The main exception is that the model misses the skewness within the top 1% of the empirical labor income distribution. One benefit of this approach is to preserve much of the information about shock variance and persistence estimated from top-coded panel data. Another benefit is that the computational burden of calibrating the model is much lighter than in Castaneda et al.'s approach.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
Firms The production function is Cobb-Douglas: F (K, L) = ΞK α L 1−α with a capital share parameter of α = 0.3. The depreciation rate of capital is set to yield a rate of return of r = 0.04 for a capital-output ratio of 2.5. The productivity parameter Ξ is normalized to yield a wage rate of w G = 1.
Government Policies
The wage tax rate is set to τ w = 0.4 following Trostel (1993). Retirement transfers amount to 40% of mean household earnings (Castaneda et al. 2000) . A similar ratio is obtained by computing the ratio of annuitized income to mean household earnings in the SCF. Annuitized income for the retired consists mostly of pensions, social security benefits and other retirement income (SCF variable 5722). The estate tax rate is set to τ b = 0.25. For poor households, this captures death expenses of roughly 20% documented in Hurd and Smith (1999) . For richer households, this represents in addition estate taxation.
Findings
This section presents the findings of the computational experiments. The analysis begins with a model of purely accidental bequests. Its ability to account for bequest and old-age savings data is examined in the next section. Then altruistic and joy-of-giving bequests are added to the model, parameterized to match the size of observed bequest flows. The final step is to compare the comparative statics predictions of the three models for a set of standard tax experiments.
Accidental Bequests
This section examines to what extent a model of purely accidental bequests can account for observed bequest and savings data. This sheds light on the hypothesis advanced by Gokhale et al. (2001) that most bequests are accidental as opposed to intended. In later sections, the paper performs similar comparisons for alternative bequest motives.
Aggregate inheritance flows The size distribution of inheritances predicted by the baseline model is shown in table 1. The last two columns compare aggregate inheritance and bequest flows with their empirical estimates. These are measured as the ratio of inheritances to mean household earnings and as the ratio of bequest flows to output. According to both measures, accidental bequests in the baseline model are nearly as large as observed bequests in U.S. data. The mean lifetime inheritance amounts to 1.15 times mean household earnings, which falls only 10% short of my estimate from the SCF. The ratio of aggregate bequest flows is in the middle of the empirical range at 1.5%. Note that accidental bequests in the baseline model are only about half as large as in the stochastic life-cycle model studied by Gokhale et al. (2001) . A likely reason is that, for reasons of computational simplicity, their model features infinitely risk-averse agents who only consume their safe incomes.
Nonetheless, my findings support Gokhale et al.'s conclusion that accidental bequests can account for virtually all observed bequest flows. The reason is that my estimate of bequest flows is only half as large as that of Gokhale et al. (2001) . 5 It is reassuring to confirm that their finding remains valid, if the assumption of infinite risk aversion is relaxed.
Since the finding of large accidental bequests is important for most of the results reported below, it is necessary to check its robustness. Among the parameters that should affect the size of accidental bequests are risk aversion, transfer levels, and mortality rates. Higher transfers should lead to smaller accidental bequests as annuitized wealth substitutes for financial wealth. However, the effect of reasonable variations in ratio of retirement transfers to mean earnings are small. Varying this ratio between 30% and 50% changes the bequest to output ratio less than 0.1%. The intuition is that the bulk of bequests is left by the richest 10% of households. For them, transfer wealth is only a small fraction of total wealth. Relaxing the assumption that all households receive the same transfer incomes would likely not change the findings very much because transfer income in the SCF is far less unequally distributed than total family income. 6 Higher risk aversion should raise precautionary saving at old age and increase accidental bequests. This is precisely why accidental bequests are large in Gokhale et al.'s (2001) model. Varying the curvature parameter of the utility function between σ = 1.2 and σ = 4 increases the bequest-output ratio from 1.2% to 1.6%, compared with a baseline value of 1.5%. I conclude that reasonable variations of σ do not overturn the main conclusion that accidental bequests are nearly as large as measured bequests. In fact, larger but still reasonable values of risk aversion imply aggregate bequest flows that exceed those in the data.
The parameter that most strongly affects accidental bequests is mortality during retirement. Higher mortality rates yield larger accidental bequests. The mortality rates of the baseline models are those for married couples starting at age 40. If the model is calibrated instead to match mortality rates of male individuals after age 65, then the bequest to output ratio increases to 3.6%. Since lower mortality rates than those of the baseline model are difficult to justify, I conclude that accidental bequest may well be larger than those of the baseline model, but are probably not smaller. 7 The importance of this finding is that it leaves little room for intended bequests. As a result, it is shown below that models with bequest motives parameterized to match reasonable aggregate inheritances have very similar implications as the baseline model which abstracts from intended bequests.
Why are accidental bequests so large? Given that accidental bequests are nearly as large as total bequests in U.S. data, it is natural to ask why this is a robust feature of the model. To gain intuition, it is instructive to calculate what fraction of retirement wealth households sacrifice as accidental bequests to insure against longevity risk. To calculate this fraction, I sort agents into decile classes based on the amount of wealth held at the end of work life. I then calculate the average bequest for each wealth decile, discounted to the last date of work. The ratio of bequests to retirement wealth is less than 10% for all wealth deciles, except for the highest which bequeaths 15% of retirement wealth. Essentially, wealthy agents expend 10-15% of their retirement wealth in order to insure against low consumption in case of late deaths.
The reason why agents are willing to sacrifice a sizeable fraction of retirement wealth is the large loss of utility suffered by households who fall into low wealth classes at old age. Households in the top retirement wealth decile consume more than 20 times mean household earnings. By contrast, households in the bottom decile consume the transfer level (40% of mean earnings). As a result, the mean marginal utility of an agent in the bottom retirement wealth quintile is more than 2000 times larger than that of an agent in the top decile. A rich household will therefore accept a substantial risk of losing wealth to accidental bequests to avoid running out of assets at old age.
To illustrate the household's optimal consumption policy, figure 2 shows the age-consumption profile of a retired household with initial wealth of 5.4 times mean household earnings (roughly the 70th percentile of the wealth distribution at the outset of retirement) who experiences mean phase lengths for the remainder of his life. 8 Consumption declines at roughly 0.5% per year until age 90, at which age the household enters the last life-cycle phase (a = a D ). Since mortality is higher in this phase, the household then depletes his assets more rapidly and consumes the transfer level after age 92. The expected fraction of retirement wealth lost to accidental bequests at each age is shown in figure 3 . This is calculated for a cohort of households who experience life-cycle phases of average length conditional on survival. By age 80, the household expects to lose 10% of retirement wealth to bequests. The fraction then levels off as the household has depleted the largest part of his wealth and eventually reaches 11%.
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE] Households would, of course, like to insure against longevity risk by purchasing annuities. Yet in the data, the fraction of retirement wealth held in the form of private annuities is small. One likely reason is that annuities are not actuarially fair because of adverse selection problems. Mitchell et al. (1999) calculate that a dollar invested in private annuities offered in the U.S. in 1995 yields an expected present value of benefit payments of 85 cents. In the model economy, wealthy households would be roughly indifferent between purchasing such annuities and investing their wealth in one period bonds, while less wealthy households would prefer not to annuitize. To make this statement precise, I calculate the household's value function with and without access to fair annuities. 9 For each level of retirement wealth for an agent without annuities, I compute the retirement wealth that yields the same indirect utility for an agent with annuities. I find that the wealthiest households would sacrifice 14-15% of retirement wealth in order to gain access to annuities, while for less wealthy households the fraction is below 10%.
Comparing the age-consumption paths of households with an without annuities, shown in figure 2, reveals that households come close to replicating the insurance benefits of annuities by holding more capital early in retirement. This explains why the welfare gain from having access to annuities with "transaction fees" of 15% are small.
Another perspective is that bequest flows are simply not that large relative to aggregate wealth. Even using Gale and Scholz's (1994) estimate that bequest flows amount to 2.65% of GDP implies that only about 1% of the aggregate capital stock is transferred in each year. These transfer flows are so small that devoting 10-15% of retirement wealth to bequests is sufficient to account for them. This appears to contradict findings of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and others suggesting that transfer wealth accounts for 80% of total wealth. The reconciliation is the generation gap and discounting. With a generation gap of 30 years and a discount rate of 5% per year, each dollar bequeathed by the parent accounts for roughly 4 dollars of child transfer wealth when discounted to the same age. Hence bequests account for 40-60% of child retirement wealth. Once inter-vivos transfers are taken into account, a transfer wealth ratio of 80% does not seem implausible. The important point is that a high transfer wealth ratio is entirely consistent with parents devoting only 10-15% of wealth to bequests.
Size distribution of inheritances In this section I compare the implications of the baseline model with data on the distribution of inheritances and retirement wealth. It was noted earlier that in U.S. data inheritances are highly concentrated among a small fraction of households. Table 1 shows that the size distribution of lifetime inheritances implied by the baseline model is consistent with the lower 90% of the empirical distribution, but fails to generate enough skewness within the top 10%. The model replicates the observation that 70% of households receive no or negligible inheritances. However, inheritances in the top 2% are smaller than in the data and account for only 55% of total bequests compared with almost 70% in the data. By contrast, for the 90th to 95th percentiles, the model over predicts inheritances by one-half (table 2) . It is not likely that accounting for inter-vivos transfers in the data would substantially change these results. For wealth-rich households, intervivos transfers are much smaller than bequests. Even the richest 2% of households rarely transfer even the maximum untaxed amount of $10,000 per year to their children (McGarry 2001). One reason why the model fails to generate the very largest estates is that it does not capture the very largest wealth holdings. While the wealth distribution implied by the model is consistent with the fraction of wealth held by the top 1% of households, it does not account for the skewness of labor income and wealth holdings within the top 1% (see table 4 and the discussion below).
In the data, lifetime inheritances increase strongly with family income at age 50 (table 3) . This observation is commonly viewed as a challenge for altruistic bequest models. While the baseline model is qualitatively consistent with the data, it underpredicts the ratio of inheritances received by income rich versus poor households. The income richest quintile of households in the SCF inherits 20 times more than the poorest. In the model, this ratio is only around 6. The smaller ratio in the PSID sample likely results from undersampling the richest households.
Wealth Data Since data on inheritances are limited, it is instructive to examine the model's ability to account for savings and wealth observations. The model matches the overall size distribution of wealth reasonably well. Table 4 shows the cumulative fractions of total wealth held by percentile classes, while table 5 shows the class means. By construction, the model replicates the fraction of wealth held by the top 1% of households. The model also roughly matches the maximum wealth levels in each percentile class, although households in the 60th through 80th percentiles hold too little wealth. The main discrepancy between model and data is the lack of skewness within the top 1% of the wealth distribution. In the SCF, the wealth richest household holds almost 90 times more wealth than the 99th percentile, while in the model this ratio is only 13. The likely reason is that the assumed labor endowment process fails to generate the very highest incomes observed in the data.
The model is less successful at matching the the wealth distribution at the outset of retirement (ages 63-67 in the data). The data show that almost 20% of households have negative net worth (not counting social security and pension wealth), while in the model virtually all households hold positive wealth (table 6) . As a result, the concentration of retirement wealth in the model is much smaller than in the data. This failure to account for wealth dispersion at retirement is a common feature in life-cycle models, in which households have a strong incentive to accumulate wealth in order to avoid low consumption states at old age. Possible explanations are explored (and rejected) in Venti and Wise (2000) . Below, I examine whether intended bequests help account for the dispersion of retirement wealth.
One way of assessing the importance of inheritances for household wealth accumulation is to compare retirement wealth for households who inherited relative to those who did not. Large differences may indicate that inheritances contribute to wealth dispersion. Such a comparison is shown in table 7, where households are divided according to whether they inherited at least 5% of mean household earnings. In the data, households who inherited hold on average 2.5 times more retirement wealth than those who did not. Moreover, the dispersion of wealth among inheriting households is much smaller than among non-inheriting households. The baseline model is qualitatively consistent with both observations, but underpredicts the differences in both mean and dispersion of inheritances.
This finding suggests that the model misses a source of intergenerational wealth persistence. Households who inherited large amounts typically have wealth rich parents and are wealth rich themselves, as the comparison with non-inheriting households reveals. However, the model shows that the intergenerational persistence of earnings together with observed bequest flows are not sufficient to account for the higher mean wealth of inheriting households. This conjecture is confirmed by the fact that the intergenerational persistence of wealth predicted by the model is consistently smaller than in the data. Mulligan (1997) finds that a regression of child log wealth on parental log wealth yields a coefficient between 0.4 and 0.5, whereas in the model the coefficient is always below 0.25. Bequests are not large enough for the vast majority of households to make wealth as persistent as earnings (for which the coefficient is 0.3). 10 Similarly, the model underpredicts the intergenerational persistence of consumption, which is only 0.33 in the model compared with 0.77 in the data (Mulligan 1997). Below I show that even fairly strong intended bequest motives do not strengthen intergenerational wealth and consumption persistence very much. This leads me to conclude that the model's lack of intergenerational persistence is not related to assumptions about bequest motives. One possible way of addressing this shortcoming may be to broaden the empirical concept of earnings. Other types of non-labor income may be more persistent across generations. For example, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (1996) find that entrepreneurship is transmitted from parents to children. Exploring additional sources of intergenerational persistence is an important task for future research.
The rate of dissaving during retirement is higher than Hurd's (1987) estimates of around 30% over ten years. In the model, households dissave around half of their retirement assets during the first 10 years. Whether this is a serious discrepancy is hard to assess because Hurd's is the only longitudinal evidence about old-age dissaving in the U.S. None of the discrepancies between model and data are sensitive to reasonable variations in model parameters, such as mortality rates, risk-aversion, or levels of government transfers.
Summary
The main findings may be summarized as follows. A model with only accidental bequests accounts for at least 80% of aggregate bequest flows. It is consistent with several key observations about inheritances and wealth inequality. In particular, the model comes close to capturing the concentration of inheritances among a small fraction of households as well as the fact that around 70% of households receive no or negligible inheritances. However, the model robustly fails to account for a number of micro observations. Most importantly, wealth inequality at the outset of retirement is far smaller than in the data. Perhaps as a result, the wealth holdings of households who inherited do not differ enough from those who did not inherit. In addition, the model robustly implies too little intergenerational persistence of wealth and consumption. The next section augments the model with altruistic or joy-ofgiving bequests and shows that neither improve the model's performance in major ways.
Intended Bequests
This section compares the properties of the accidental bequest model with versions of the model that incorporate either altruistic or joy-of-giving bequests. Consider first models that are calibrated to match my estimate of mean inheritances relative to household earnings of 1.3. Bequest intensity in the altruistic model is only ψ = 0.1 in this case. It therefore comes as no surprise that the model's steady state properties are very similar to those of the baseline model with purely accidental bequests. The altruistic model slightly improves the skewness of the inheritance distribution. By contrast, the joy-of-giving model implies far more dispersed bequests with a too large fraction of households receiving bequests (table 1) . As a result, the bottom 70% of households receive 16% of aggregate inheritances, compared with 0% in the data. Failing to account for the fact that most households receive no inheritances is a robust anomaly of the joy-of-giving specification with CRRA preferences. The intuition is obvious: the marginal utility of leaving a bequest is unbounded at zero. It is possible that the performance of the joy-of-giving model would improve with other bequest utility functions, but these would not, in general, be consistent with balanced growth. A more promising approach may be to specify utility over lifetime bequests and gifts, which may be less concentrated than bequests. Unfortunately, measuring lifetime inter-vivos transfers poses difficult data problems.
Neither bequest motive improves the correlation between inheritances and household income (table  3) . The ratio of inheritances received by the top versus the bottom quintile is 5.4 in the altruistic case, which is very close to the accidental bequest case and much smaller than in the data. In the joy-of-giving case the ratio is even smaller. Neither bequest motive alters the wealth distribution (overall or at retirement age) very much. The altruistic model captures the differences in mean wealth holdings between households who did and did not inherit only slightly better (table 7) . However, it does not capture the striking difference in wealth concentration between the two groups. In the joy-ofgiving model virtually all households inherit more than 5% of mean earnings, making this comparison infeasible. Dissaving during retirement is slightly slower, but still above Hurd's (1987) estimates.
Since some empirical estimates of aggregate bequest flows are larger than mine, it is useful to examine the robustness of these findings to stronger bequest motives. The largest bequest-output ratio consistent with the data is 2.65% (Gale and Scholz 1994) . Choosing the bequest intensity parameter ψ to match this ratio has little effect on most steady state properties. The main exception is that inheritances in the joy-of-giving model become even more dispersed. Finally, consider the case of altruism with ψ = 1, an assumption implicit in infinite horizon models. Now aggregate bequest flows are much larger than in the data (B/Y = 0.042). However, it is still the case that only about one-third of households receives an inheritance greater than 10% of mean earnings. The intuition for this finding is that most households expect their children to be richer than themselves. This is due to the skewness of the income distribution (Benabou 2000). In addition, children's consumption is discounted and uncertain. As a result, even when parents value children's utility as much as their own, the bequest motive is not operative for the majority of households. However, the strong bequest motive significantly affects the wealth distribution. It does not, however, improve and of the model's empirical shortcomings.
In sum, augmenting the model by reasonable amounts of either altruistic or joy-of-giving bequests has little impact on the model's steady state properties. The main exception is that joy-of-giving bequests are far more dispersed than in the data. The model's lack of intergenerational wealth and consumption persistence is not substantially improved by larger bequest flows. This leads me to conclude that the model's empirical shortcomings may have reasons not related to assumptions about bequest motives, but to the sources of intergenerational persistence.
Tax Experiments
This section addresses the question how alternative assumptions about bequest motives affect the outcomes of tax policy experiments. Given that no consensus has been reached in the literature as to which bequest motive best accounts for the data, it is important to investigate the robustness of tax effects to alternative ways of modeling bequests.
Income taxation A number of previous studies found that altruistic bequests substantially magnify the effects of income tax changes (see Engen et al. 1997 and Hendricks 2001) . However, these findings are based on models in which the bequest motive is operative for all households and where all bequests are intended. Here, I reconsider the role of bequest motives in an environment with realistic lifespan uncertainty which captures the fact that most households do not leave bequests to their children. In this section I consider changes in labor income and in capital income taxation, while the next section studies estate taxation. In order to obtain results that are easily interpreted, I assume government spending is adjusted to balance the government budget in every period. Table 10 shows the changes in the aggregate capital stock and in output due to a 10% capital income tax. The first row shows the model with only accidental bequests. Higher capital income taxes crowd out saving and investment; as a result, output declines. Rows 2 and 3 show models with altruistic and joy-of-giving bequests, respectively. The bequest intensity ψ is chosen to match a ratio of mean bequests to mean household earnings of 1.3. The changes in major aggregates are very close to the case of only accidental bequests. The findings are similar for a reduction in the labor income tax rate by ten percentage points (table 11). Given that labor supply is exogenous, a wage tax has only income effects, but no distortionary effects. Hence, the tax change would not affect steady state output or capital in an infinite horizon model. Households respond to higher earnings by saving more. As a result, the capital stock increases. With fixed labor supply, output must increase and the interest rate falls. As in the case of a capital income tax, the outcomes are nearly unaffected by the presence of intended bequests.
The finding that the outcomes of income tax changes are insensitive to assumptions about bequest motives is robust to sensible variations in the size of bequest flows. Rows 4 and 5 of the tables display the effects of tax changes when the bequest intensity ψ is chosen to match the highest bequest-output ratio found in the literature (B/Y = 2.65%; see Gale and Scholz 1994) . The changes in aggregates are very similar to the accidental bequest case. Even assuming that altruistic parents value their childrens utility as much as their own (ψ = 1; row 6 of tables 11 and 10) has little effect on the capital tax experiment, even though the aggregate bequest-output ratio of 4.2% is much larger than in the data. The output response of the wage tax change is reduced 14%, but remains much larger than in a model where all households have operative altruistic bequest motives (in which case the output response is zero). I conclude that abstracting from intended bequests does not alter the effects of income tax changes in important ways. This contrasts with the findings of Engen et al. (1997) and Hendricks (2000) who find that the common assumption that all parents leave positive bequests to their children leads to tax effects that differ substantially from those implied by a model without a bequest motive.
A common simplifying assumption in life-cycle models is that bequests are redistributed in equal lump-sums to all living households (e.g., Huggett 1996) . In this case, all intergenerational links are eliminated, which greatly simplifies that characterization of equilibria. The question addressed in this section is how this abstraction affects the model's comparative statics properties. The last rows of tables 10 and 11 show the effects of capital and labor income tax changes in the baseline model with redistributed bequests. 11 The changes in capital and output are about 15% smaller than in the baseline model for the capital tax experiment, while they are roughly 10% larger in the labor income tax case. These discrepancies are much larger than those caused by reasonable variations in intended bequests, suggesting that the common practice of abstracting from intergenerational transfers can substantially affect the outcomes of tax experiments.
Estate taxation It is perhaps not surprising that bequest motives matter for the analysis of estate taxation. Table 12 shows the changes in capital and output due to a confiscatory estate tax (τ b = 1). Tax revenue are redistributed in equal lump-sum transfers,τ , to all households. The level of these transfers is chosen such that aggregate transfer flows equal aggregate bequest tax revenues:
Total lump-sum transfers received by a household are then given by τ s =τ for working age households (a(s) ≤ a R ) and τ s =τ + τ R for retired households. If all bequests are accidental, taxing bequests increases the capital stock. By contrast, with intended bequests, estate taxation reduces the capital stock. The magnitude of this effect depends both on the bequest motive and on its intensity.
[ They find that the effect of bequests on wealth inequality depends on the presence of a social security system. In the absence of such a system, bequests increase wealth inequality, while bequests slightly reduce inequality without social security. Here, I revisit the question in a model that accounts for key features of U.S. inheritance data and that encompasses various bequest motives. The approach is to examine the changes in the wealth distribution that result from redistributing bequests in equal lump-sums to all living households. The starting point are the steady states of the baseline models with accidental bequests or with altruistic or joy-of-giving bequests that are parameterized to match a bequest-output ratio of 2.65% (Gale and Scholz 1994). 12 These are compared with versions of the model in which bequests are redistributed, while all other model parameters are held constant in the comparisons. 13 This amounts to taxing bequests at a confiscatory rate and also sheds light on the consequences of estate taxation.
The results are shown in table 13. For each type of bequest motive, the table displays the cumulative fraction of wealth held by various percentile classes. The effects of taxing estates are very similar in all cases. Households who would like to borrow, mostly early on in life using future inheritances as collateral, are unable to do so when bequests are taxed. As a result, wealth holdings in the lower 60% of the distribution increase. Taxing estates has little impact on households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution. As a result, overall wealth inequality diminishes somewhat. The results suggest that even confiscatory estate taxation does not reduce wealth inequality by more than small amounts.
[ INSERT TABLE 13 HERE] A similar question is studied by De Nardi (2000) in a model with accidental and joy-of-giving bequests. The issue addressed is whether accidental or joy-of-giving bequests help account for the wealth concentration observed in U.S. data. A key feature of De Nardi's model is that the labor endowment process matches the persistence and variance found in top-coded household earnings data. As a result, the model generates little wealth concentration, at least in the absence of bequests. De Nardi finds that accidental bequests contribute virtually nothing to wealth inequality. By contrast, intended bequests increase the share of wealth held by the top 1% of the population from 6% to 12%, which is, however, still far lower than the 29.5% of wealth held by the wealthiest 1% of U.S. households.
Replicating De Nardi's experiment requires only a single modification to my model: the highest labor endowment state must be dropped. Table 14 shows the wealth distribution implied by such a modified model. The first row displays the wealth distribution of my SCF sample. The subsequent rows show a model without bequests, with only accidental bequests, and with altruistic and joy-of-giving bequests, respectively.
[ INSERT TABLE 14 HERE] In the model without bequests any accidental bequests are redistributed in equal lump-sums to all living households. The fraction of wealth held by the top 1% of households of 21% falls short of the wealth concentration observed in U.S. data, but is much larger than in De Nardi's model. An important reason for this is the stochastic aging structure of my model. While the model replicates the cross-section earnings dispersion found in the data, stochastic aging increases the dispersion of lifetime earnings. Households with longer work lives hold substantially more retirement wealth than those with short work lives. Adding accidental bequests has little effect on wealth inequality, except that the fraction of households with negative or negligible wealth increases as young households borrow against future inheritances. This is consistent with De Nardi's findings.
Adding fairly strong joy-of-giving bequests (matching a bequest-output ratio of 2.65%) has only a minimal effect on wealth inequality. The reason is that bequests are quite dispersed as pointed out earlier. This contrasts strongly with De Nardi's finding that joy-of-giving bequests substantially increase wealth concentration. One possible reason is that De Nardi postulates a joy-of-giving utility function of the form ψ(1 + k 0 /8) 1−σ , which differs from the more common constant relative risk aversion form assumed here. 14 This functional form is chosen to approximate the marginal utility obtained from an altruistic parent leaving a bequest. It is therefore interesting to note that adding altruistic bequests, parameterized to match a bequest-output ratio of 2.65%, to my model further increases wealth inequality. This is qualitatively consistent with De Nardi's finding, although the effect is much weaker here. With altruism, the top 5% hold 60% of wealth compared with 55% in the case of accidental bequests. However, bequest flows are likely larger than in the data. I conclude that altruistic bequests help account for observed wealth concentration, but the contribution is small.
Conclusion
This paper studies the consequences of accidental and intended bequests in stochastic life-cycle models with uninsured idiosyncratic risk. Four main findings emerge. (i) Accidental bequests are nearly as large as total bequests in U.S. data. As a result, life-cycle models leave little room for intended bequests. (ii) Accidental or altruistic bequests can account for key features of the size distributions of inheritances and wealth. However, regardless of the bequest motive or its strength, the model fails to generate as much intergenerational persistence as in the data. (iii) The steady state and comparative statics properties of the model are little affected by assumptions about the type or strength of parental bequest motives, unless bequests are much larger than in the data. However, abstracting from bequests as is commonly done in life-cycle models modifies the outcomes of tax experiments in important ways. (iv ) Neither accidental nor intended bequests have sizable effects on the wealth distribution. As a result, even confiscatory estate taxation may not be an effective instrument for promoting wealth equality.
Future research should consider several extensions. An important alternative to the bequest motives studied here is the exchange motive (Bernheim et al. 1985) . Additional types of transfers should be incorporated into the model. Inter vivos transfers of money and time as well as parental investments in the human capital of their children deserve particular attention.
Appendix

Computational Algorithm
The algorithm simulates a single long dynasty of households. The stationary distributions of variables are approximated by their distributions over this dynasty's history. Aggregate quantities are calculated by summing over dates. For example, aggregate consumption is computed as C = P c t where c t denotes the amount consumed by an individual member of the stand-in dynasty at date t. When computing the aggregate capital stock, it is necessary to correct this expression for the fact that young agents borrow their initial capital endowments using their future inheritances as "collateral." When summing over the time path of capital holdings, k 0 (1 + r) i must be subtracted from each agent's capital stock prior to age T G because this amount is borrowed from another agent.
The household problem is solved by backward induction. The policy functions c(s) and κ(s) are approximated on a grid for the capital stock via linear interpolation.
